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Over the recent years, decentralization has been adopted in many  health systems. The
question however remains of whether local actors do better than the central government.
We  summarize the main insights from economic theory on the impact of decentraliza-
tion  and its empirical validation. Theory suggests that the decision to decentralize results
from  a trade-off between its advantages (like its capacity to cater to local tastes) and costs
(like inter-regional spillovers). Empirical contributions point that decentralization results in
better  health outcomes and higher expenditures, resulting in ambiguous consequences on
efﬁciency; equity consequences are controversial and address the relevance of redistribution
mechanisms.
©  2012 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights
reserved.
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r  e  s  u  m  o
Apesar de muitos sistemas de saúde terem optado recentemente pela descentralizac¸ão,
ﬁca por esclarecer se os governos locais têm um melhor desempenho do que os cen-
trais. Este artigo sumariza os principais resultados da teoria económica sobre o impacto da
descentralizac¸ão  e a sua validade empírica. A decisão de descentralizar resulta duma arbi-
tragem entre as vantagens, como a adaptac¸ão às preferências, e os inconvenientes, como as
externalidades inter-regionais. Os estudos empíricos sugerem que a descentralizac¸ão per-mite  ganhos em saúde mas também despesas maiores, com consequências ambíguas em
termos de eﬁciência, e que as consequências para a equidade, sendo controversas, indicam
a  relevância dos mecanismos de redistribuic¸ão.
© 2012 Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos os∗ Corresponding author.
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ntroduction
ver the recent years, decentralization has been one of the
ain reforms adopted in many  health systems. Strong deci-
ion power of sub-central governments already existed in
candinavian counties and in federal states like Canada,
witzerland and Australia1; the most recent devolution pro-
esses have been observed in NHS systems, namely in Spain
nd Italy (toward regions), and the UK (toward Wales, Scot-
and, Northern Ireland). In a few words, more  delegation to
ocal authorities was expected to improve services through
 combination of better knowledge of local needs, prefer-
nces and providers’ characteristics, higher accountability of
olicy-makers and efﬁciency-enhancing competition among
urisdictions.
These expected beneﬁts are however far from obvious
nd the major question for policy-makers and researchers
emains, that is, whether local actors really do better than
he central government. Put differently, the issue is whether
ecentralization allows for the provision of better and equi-
able health services to all citizens at an acceptable cost.
ates2 was the ﬁrst one to suggest that the decision to decen-
ralize results from a trade-off between its advantages and
osts. Whether the beneﬁts actually outweigh the costs – the
fﬁciency issue – is ultimately an empirical question. The
iterature has mainly focused on overall efﬁciency by esti-
ating the impact of decentralization on economic growth.3,4
nother alternative is to measure the impact of decentraliza-
ion on sectoral policies.5 Decentralization of health policies
s relatively recent; the literature is still scarce and often pro-
ides contradictory results. We  summarize the main insights
rom economic theory on the impact of decentralization of
ealth policies, and we  review empirical studies that have
ested some of these theoretical assumptions.
nstitutional  context
ecentralization in health care can adopt many  different
orms. Following the typology proposed by Vrangbaek,6 our
ain interest here is in devolution or political decentralization,
hrough which power is “decentralized to lower-level political
uthorities such as regions or municipalities”. Other forms
f decentralization are also possible which are beyond the
cope of the present paper. De-concentration and bureaucra-
ization involve transfers between administrative levels and
rom political to administrative level, respectively (think for
xample in the Portuguese context, of transfer of competences
o Regional Health Authorities). Decentralization also refers
o delegation, which involves transferring power to more  or
ess autonomous public organization management (like pub-
ic enterprises, for example the “hospitals S.A” in Portugal,
oundation Trusts in the UK or public insurance companies
n Bismarckian-type health systems). Privatization itself can
e considered as a form of decentralization.Our focus here is thus on the transfer of political authority
n the health area from higher to lower levels of government
r from national to sub-national levels.7 Regional, provincial
r municipal elected governments may thus be responsible for . 2 0 1 3;3  1(1):74–83 75
planning, organizing, delivering and ﬁnancing health services.
Multiple arrangements are however possible and devolution
has taken many  different forms across OECD countries (for a
complete mapping of decentralization experiences in Europe,
see Bankauskaite et al.8). The size of decentralized entities
is highly variable, from small counties in Sweden (average
population 31,000) to large autonomous regions in Spain (aver-
age population 2,444,000). The extent of competences also
varies. The central state may keep responsibilities in several
domains, for instance the Canadian Federal state deﬁnes poli-
cies regarding health prevention and promotion, the Swiss
Confederation deﬁnes the basic health beneﬁt package, and
generally all central states impose a series of more  or less
stringent regulations on quality, supply, coverage, pricing
rules or budget allocation. A key issue which differentiates
decentralization experiences relates to the funding of health
expenditures and ﬁnancial autonomy. Decentralized govern-
ments may have the power to raise taxes, or receive transfers
depending on their contribution to ﬁscal revenues. They may
then be free to set the budget allocated to health and its
distribution among health sectors. By contrast, sub-central
government levels may be ﬁnanced by transfers based on
risk-equalization schemes and beneﬁt from low autonomy
in deﬁning tax rates. In the latter case, decentralized gov-
ernments may thus have the political power to decide about
allocation of resources but do not control the amount of
available resources for health. Hence the expenditure side is
decentralized, but revenue is not.
Fig. 1, extracted from Joumard et al.9, nicely describes
the degree of decentralization in health in OECD countries
(where a 0 score implies that central government takes most
of key decisions while a 6 score implies residual competences
for the central government). Countries have heterogeneous
sub-central governments, with different size, autonomy and
responsibilities allocated. The criteria to deﬁne this score have
been established by Paris et al.10, using a survey. They include
in particular the sub-central governments’ authority on set-
ting tax bases and rates, the budget allocation for health
and its distribution between health sectors, the ﬁnancing of
different health services and practitioners and the setting
of public health objectives. Spain, Canada, Finland, Sweden
and Switzerland have higher autonomy of sub-central govern-
ments while Portugal is among the countries with the lowest
health decentralization.
Note that the decentralization question, the way we pose
it (devolution or political decentralization), is more  common
in NHS-type health systems. These systems have been usually
characterized by highly centralized decision-making, with one
single insurer/payer and provider (the central state), and lit-
tle autonomy given to providers. By contrast, health systems
based on social insurance schemes have been usually char-
acterized, to various extents, by multiple insurance schemes
and some degree of publicly subsidized private provision.
Hence, transferring power to local institutions has certainly
responded to a demand for more  autonomy in more  rigid NHS-
type health systems.Spain, Canada and Italy are particularly relevant cases to
understand the empirical literature because the consequences
of decentralization in health have been more  extensively
analyzed. The most decentralized country according to
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 couFig. 1 – Decentralization score for OECD
Joumard et al.9 is Spain. The central government provides the
general framework and coordinates the health system while
Autonomous Communities (AC) provide health care services
and are responsible for health planning, organization and
management.11 Funds are centrally collected and allocated
to regions by means of a block central grant following an
unadjusted capitation formula.11 Only Navarra and the Basque
Country beneﬁt from ﬁscal authority.
By contrast, the Canadian Confederation, composed of 10
provinces and 3 territories, has been decentralized since the
19th century.12 Health funding, administration and delivering
are competences of provinces, which also deﬁne physician
ﬁnancing rules and hospital global budgets. However health
promotion, prevention and provision to speciﬁc groups are
Federal competencies. Provinces are responsible for fund-
ing health care expenditures, based on provincial taxes and
transfers from the central government. Transfers depend
themselves on taxes collected at provincial level; an equal-
ization program was however implemented to avoid strong
differences in transfers related to discrepancies in provinces’
revenue-generating potential.13
Finally, the 20 Italian regions also control health care
provision, although general objectives (like the detailed list
of services to be provided) and main principles of the health
system are deﬁned at the central level. Regions can develop
regional health plans, allocate resources and collect revenues
freely, like setting user charges for drugs prescriptions or
reimburse rates for drugs and services not covered at national
level. Regional authorities also enjoy ﬁnancial autonomy
in taxation; in practice, regional health expenditures are
ﬁnanced at 36.7% by regional taxes.14 Additionally, regional
health expenditures are ﬁnanced by transfers from the central
state (57.3% of expenditures), essentially from a so-called
National equalizing fund. This fund is based on the idea that
all regions must achieve a minimum level of expenditures, so
that transfers top up regions’ own revenue in case it is unable
to fund this minimum level.
Theoretical  backgroundThe debate on the relative merits of policy decentralization
dates back to Tiebout,15 who put forward a very optimisticntries (extracted from Joumard et al.9).
argument for the optimality of local public good provi-
sion, based on an analogy between competitive markets
and competing jurisdictions. Oates,2 in contrast, suggests
that decentralization results from a trade-off between its
advantages and costs. According to Oates, the advantage of
decentralization lies in its capacity to cater to local tastes, be
it because of better information or simply because the cen-
tral government cannot differentiate public good provision.
The cost of decentralization stems essentially from the pres-
ence of inter-regional spillovers. For instance, better health
prevention in one municipality beneﬁts its neighbors. How-
ever, if health prevention is decentralized, each municipality
fails to take into account the beneﬁt of its investment in other
municipalities, and is therefore likely to invest sub-optimally,
leading to under-provision and/or low quality of health ser-
vices. While Oates’ argument that a central government is
unable to differentiate the provision of local public goods
according to local preferences has been challenged since, his
main intuition that the decision to decentralize rests on a fun-
damental trade-off between costs and advantages remains.
One of the main costs of decentralization which has been
analyzed in the literature is the failure to exploit economies
of scale.16 For instance, collective purchasing of resources
(drugs, medical devices, equipments, etc.) or collective admin-
istration of health services may display decreasing average
costs and be thus more  efﬁciently provided at a centralized
level.
The inter-regional spillovers at the heart of Oates’s argu-
ment, referred here-above, are of the horizontal type (that is,
between sub-central governments of the same level). Another
sort of spillovers which may create inefﬁciencies under decen-
tralization is the vertical ones between local and central
governments. These occur if one government level’s policy
decisions have an impact in the policy outcomes of the other
level. These phenomena are highly plausible in the health care
sector. If, for example, sub-central governments are respon-
sible for some public health prevention programs and the
central state delivers health care, local policies likely affect
services use and costs at the central level. Unless sub-central
governments are rewarded for their actions, they have little
incentives to provide an optimal value of prevention, whose
beneﬁts are fully enjoyed by the central state.
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Recently, the literature has put forward political economy
rguments in favor of decentralization. For instance, it may
e that the voters, who are imperfectly informed about the
conomy, use the policies put in place by the neighboring
oliticians to impose discipline on their own local repre-
entative. In such a world of opportunistic policy makers,
ecentralization may be a strong mechanism to prevent cor-
uption or promote provision of public services.17 Another
rgument is that decentralization forces local jurisdictions to
ompete for mobile resources (for instance, labor or capital)
nd puts a downward pressure on taxation, thus prompting a
ore  efﬁcient use of scarce resources (see Wilson18 for a sur-
ey of the tax competition literature). Besley and Smart19 show
hat this need not be the case, since higher discipline of local
oliticians comes at the cost of a worse selection. Indeed, it
s only when an opportunistic politician misbehaves that the
oters are given the chance to oust her from power and replace
er with a potentially benevolent politician. Political account-
bility results from a trade-off between these two mechanisms
discipline and selection), and further decentralization has
pposite effects in both.
What can be said about the likelihood of local govern-
ents being captured by special interests? Bardhan and
ookherjee20 show that there is no theoretical reason to sup-
ose that local governments are more  prone to this than
entral ones. They put forward a theoretical model of proba-
ilistic voting where capture by special interests results from a
ombination of voter awareness, interest group cohesiveness,
lectoral uncertainty and competition, district heterogeneity
nd the electoral system. Their main conclusion is that the
xtent of capture at the local level is most likely context-
peciﬁc and needs to be assessed empirically.
A few authors have looked at the applicability of these argu-
ents to the speciﬁc case of health decentralization. Levaggi
nd Smith21 claim that sub-central governments are better
nformed about the constraints of local supply and about vari-
tions in demand. Variations in demand are obviously related
rst to differences in local needs, for instance regions experi-
nce discrepancies in the prevalence of diseases, in behavioral
nd non-behavioral risk factors (including in particular age-
ng or social determinants), perhaps also in the effectiveness
f speciﬁc interventions. Hence priorities are likely to differ
ccording to burden of disease or cost-effectiveness criteria.
lso local preferences shape variations in demand, leading
o different priorities and resource allocation criteria. We  may
hink that some regions have a higher concern for inequalities
n health and social determinants, while others put a greater
mphasis on provider choice and responsiveness to patients’
references. These differences in needs and preferences are
ery clear if we  compare European countries. Discrepancies
n local supply are related to the availability and density of
hysicians, nurses, equipments, but also to differences in
ocal prices and practices. Central governments have tried to
ccount for these differences in ﬁnancing sub-central govern-
ents, through more  or less sophisticated risk-adjustment
chemes, but may not be able to address these issues to locally
djusted planning or organization. Sub-central governments
ay be better equipped to respond to local preferences and
riorities, to coordinate providers’ actions and to identify the
ources of inefﬁciency. Hence, decentralization is expected to . 2 0 1 3;3  1(1):74–83 77
enhance quality and responsiveness of care while reducing
costs; this theoretical view is at the origin of most decentral-
ization processes.
As regards the potential incentives that favor efﬁciency
and/or quality in health care provision, both the tax compe-
tition and the yardstick competition mechanisms are likely
to arise in health policies, thus leading sub-central govern-
ments to compete with each other to provide high-quality
services at low user charges or ﬁnanced through lower taxes.
First, better and more  efﬁcient services contribute to attract
mobile citizens, hence increase sub-central governments’
economic activity and ﬁscal revenues. Second, competition
occurs through citizens benchmarking their demands on the
basis of neighbor sub-central governments’ performance.22 If
sub-central governments are politically accountable, a local
politician providing poorer services than his neighbors’ coun-
terparts would likely fail re-election. In a few words, efﬁcient
provision contributes to attractiveness and citizens’ satisfac-
tion.
It is a well-known fact that decentralization may ham-
per redistribution (see, Cremer et al.23 for a survey of the
literature), when taxes are locally collected. Areas with
high health needs are in general the poorer ones (there is
large evidence of the relationship between poverty and poor
health status, see Marmot Review24); under ﬁscal decentral-
ization, underprivileged areas capture lower resources from
taxation and beneﬁt from a lower capacity to invest in high-
quality services and efﬁcient provision. Decentralization then
produces differences in the quality and availability of ser-
vices, charges and outcomes. Increasing inequity is one of the
major threats of decentralization, even if good risk-sharing
agreements potentially mitigate this effect. In other words,
the viability of decentralization depends on the existence
of solidarity mechanisms between decentralized authori-
ties.
The reverse is also possible, i.e., sub-central governments
only competing on high-quality services, leading to over-
provision of services and high health expenditures (race to
the top). This situation is more  likely to occur when ﬁscal
decentralization is low and sub-central governments face soft
budget constraints. This may the case, for example, if the
central government systematically bails out sub-central gov-
ernments which are excessively indebted or if transfers to
sub-central governments are based on past expenditures.
This brings us to the fundamental question of the fund-
ing of local public goods. Indeed, various arrangements are
possible regarding the degree of decentralization of both
the expenditure and the revenue functions.25 A considerable
share of local government funding comes from central gov-
ernment transfers. These transfer schemes must be carefully
designed and rest on clear rules (depend on variables which
are not easy for local governments to manipulate) so as to
avoid moral  hazard leading to excess expenditures. Indeed, as
the central government is unable to distinguish the sources of
high spending between higher needs and inefﬁciencies, sub-
central governments have an incentive to hide their true needs
to obtain higher ﬁnancing from the central authority.
To sum up, the theoretical literature does not provide a
deﬁnitive answer about the impact of decentralization on
health policies. The high concern in many  countries for equity
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Table 1 – Literature review: impact of decentralization.
1st author Country Objective Period of the
data
Decentralization indicator Main results
Zhong (2010) Canada Impact of the introduction of a
higher degree of decentralization
on equity in health care utilization
1994/95
1998/99
2000/01
Introduction of Health and Social
Transfer in 1996/97, i.e., larger
block funding to provinces
Most inequity in health care use is explained by
variations within provinces. An increase in
decentralization lead to lower overall and
within-province inequity in GP and hospital services
and lower between-province variation in GP,
hospital and specialist services
Schefﬂer (2006  S.) USA/California Impact of higher decentralization
of mental health care services on
uninsured health spending
1989–2000 Decentralization of health, mental
health, and social services (greater
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and
responsibility) from the California
state to counties (program
realignment introduced the ability
to transfer funds between
programs – mental health, social
services and general health)
County spending on mental health services
decreased after program realignment. Counties with
above median health revenues are less likely to
make a transfer to another program. With
realignment, counties showed the same level of
commitment and support with mental health
services, since diverted funds went mainly to
mental health services within the realignment
programs package
Jiménez-Rubio (2011A) 20 OECD countries Impact of decentralization on
health status (infant mortality)
1970–2001 Decentralization measured as: (i)
Share of autonomous tax revenue
of SCG over the CG tax revenue. (ii)
Share of total (autonomous or not)
SCG tax over the total revenue
Negative and signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁscal
decentralization and infant mortality, if a
substantial degree of autonomy in the sources of
revenue is devolved to sub-central governments
Prieto (2012) Spain Estimate determinants of regional
health care expenditure, in
particular the degree of regional
autonomy
1992–2005 Regions clustered according to the
degree of autonomy: (i)
Expenditure and high ﬁscal
autonomy. (ii) Expenditure and low
ﬁscal autonomy. (iii) No autonomy
GDP/capita has more inﬂuence on HCE in regions
with higher tax autonomy, maybe due to
equalization efforts of Spanish NHS.
Decentralization without inequality is possible with
ﬁscal equalization. If high differences in wealth and
weak equalization among regions, decentralization
leads to inequality
Bordignon (2009  B.) Italy Impact of regions’ bailout
expectations on funding by CG;
impact of regions’ bailout
expectations on HCE (mid-90s),
determinants of regions’ bailout
expectations
1990–1999 Regions’ bailout expectations
based on external constraints in
the mid-90s: countries’ evaluation
for entering the EURO (1997), index
of public budget tightness,
Maastricht rules (1994)
HCE is inﬂuenced by regional ﬁnancing, which is in
turn inﬂuenced by bailout expectations from the CG.
Lower expectations of bailing out generate a
stronger link between ex-ante ﬁnancing and
regional HCE. Richer and more autonomous regions
have lower expectations of CG intervention, hence
they are more ﬁnancially responsible. The CG is also
more prone to cut ﬁnancing to regions under lower
bailout expectations because the commitment to
cut HCE will be taken seriously
Fredriksson (2008  F.) Sweden Estimate cross-counties
differences in supporting the
“Patient Choice
Recommendation”, i.e., counties’
willingness to favor or not the
patient’s choice of specialist
2001–2005 Recommendation by the CG can be
more or less supported by
counties, which have large
competences in the health sector
High variation on support for the Patient Choice
Recommendation among county councils.
Ability to choose healthcare provider varies
according to county, creating inequalities in access
to care
r
 e
 v
 p
 o
 r
 t
 s
 a
 ú
 d
 e
 p
 ú
 b
 l
 i
 c
 a
 .
 2
 0
 1
 3
;3
 1
(1
):74–83
 
79
Table 1 (Continued)
1st author Country Objective Period of the
data
Decentralization indicator Main results
López-Casasnovas (2007  L.-C.) 110 regions in 8
OECD countries
Measure the determinants of HCE
accounting for regional effects
1997  No indicator of decentralization
but account for possible regional
differences in HCE
An increase on the percentage of people with more
than 65 years and in the percentage of public health
expenditures increases HCE. Between countries
variability of expenditures is smaller than within
country variations. Income elasticity of HCE is low
and increases with variation in HCE
Costa-Font (2007  C.-F.) Spain Measure spatial spillovers in HCE
(inter-jurisdiction interactions in
deﬁning HCE)
2003 Compare regions with (i) ﬁscal and
political autonomy (Navarra and
Basque country); (ii) political
autonomy (Catalonia, Galicia,
Andalucía, Canarias and Valencia);
(iii) no autonomy
Evidence of spatial correlation. Higher HCE when
regions have higher political decentralization and
even higher if they have also ﬁscal decentralization.
Higher HCE if region and CG are ruled by the same
party
Costa-i-Font (2005  C.-i.-F.) Spain Measure income-related
intra-regional inequalities in
self-reported health, and its
relation with the degree of
decentralization
1997 Compare regions with (i) ﬁscal and
political autonomy (Navarra and
Basque country); (ii) political
autonomy (Catalonia, Galicia,
Andalucía, Canarias and Valencia);
(iii) no autonomy
Overall inequality is low. Devolution does not favor
inter-region inequality. By contrast devolution
seems to favor pro-equity policies: inequality is the
highest in regions without autonomy (INSALUD)
Crivelli (2006  C.) Switzerland Measure determinants of public
HCE accounting for regional
(cantons) effects
1996–2001 No indicator of decentralization
but account for possible regional
differences in HCE
Differences in HCE related to usual factors but in
particular to physician density. Strong differences in
HCE across cantons explained in part by differences
in supply
Costa-Font (2009  C.-F.) Spain Impact of decentralization on HCE,
interdependency between
neighbor municipalities and
measure income effect at regional
level
1995–2002 Indicators of decentralization
degree and its evolution across
time, toward current situation: (i)
ﬁscal and political autonomy
(Navarra and Basque country); (ii)
political autonomy (Catalonia,
Galicia, Andalucía, Canarias,
Valencia); (iii) no autonomy
Political decentralization increases HCE in the short
term but produces cost savings in the long run (sunk
cost of decentralization and experience effects).
Higher expenditures are related to higher ﬁscal
autonomy. Existence of spatial correlation. Low
impact of income on HCE, hence decentralization is
not associated to strong regional inequalities
Cantarero (2005  C.) Spain Measure determinants of public
HCE accounting for regional effects
1993–1999 Compare regions with (i) ﬁscal and
political autonomy (Navarra and
Basque country); (ii) political
autonomy (Catalonia, Galicia,
Andalucía, Canarias, Valencia); (iii)
no autonomy
Regional  income and supply have low impact on
HCE, while ageing is more relevant. Hence lower
income-related inequality is expected
Jiménez-Rubio (2011) Canada Impact of ﬁscal decentralization
on health outcomes (infant
mortality)
1979–1995 Fiscal decentralization is
measured as the proportion of
sub-national health spending over
total health expenditure
Signiﬁcant and substantially lower infant mortality
related to higher ﬁscal decentralization (1% increase
in ﬁscal decentralization decreases infant mortality
by 10%)
Giannoni (2002) Italy Measure determinants of HCE
accounting for regional effects,
and impact of 1992
cost-containment reforms
1980–1995 No indicator of decentralization
but account for possible regional
differences in HCE
Strong impact of regional income on HCE and
relevant area cluster differences. Cost-containment
reforms did not alter most regional differences in
HCE and worsened the situation of some regions
below the average
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in health is a major argument against decentralization, unless
strong solidarity mechanisms are put in place. The contra-
dictory expectations about efﬁciency require careful empirical
validation. In these times of adverse economic circumstances,
efﬁciency is more  than ever a major issue in decision-making,
and strong evidence is necessary before advocating for decen-
tralization in health.
Empirical  evidence
In order to get an exhaustive overview on empirical evidence,
we performed a systematic literature review. We conducted a
computerized literature search in PubMed (National Center for
Biotechnology Information, Bethesda, Maryland) and Google
Scholar, supplemented by a search of quoted references. Text
keywords used in the search included decentralization, feder-
alism, health, health care, equity, and efﬁciency. We  restricted
our analysis to those performed in OECD countries to allow
for relevant comparisons, that is, in a comparable context. We
only included empirical studies about the impact of decen-
tralization, hence excluding theoretical studies, studies about
legislation or about political or organizational aspects of
decentralization, editorials and literature reviews. The search
was limited to English-language articles published from 1995
to July 2012, when decentralization in health has become a rel-
evant and applied policy option in OECD countries. Our search
allowed collecting 17 papers, whose main characteristics and
results are displayed in Table 1. Studies were divided according
to distinct analyzes, based on the most relevant decentraliza-
tion outcomes, namely inequalities in health and health care,
health expenditures and health outcomes.
Inequality  in  health  and  health  care  use
The consequences of decentralization on inequality were the
main issue analyzed by Zhong13, Jiménez-Rubio et al.1, Costa-
i-Font26 and Frederiksson and Winblad27. Zhong13 found that
in Canada inequalities in health care use (overall, within
provinces and between provinces) decreased after decentral-
ization. Most inequality was explained by within-provinces
variation, while between-provinces variations did not much
contribute to inequality.13 By contrast, Jiménez-Rubio et al.1
also using data from Canadian provinces observed that
income-related inequalities in health care use resulted from
between-provinces variations while income-related inequali-
ties in health were related to within-region variations. While
Zhong13 used an overall inequity measure, Jiménez-Rubio
et al.1 used an income-related one, which possibly explains
the discrepant results. The results by Jiménez-Rubio et al.1
certainly question the equalization scheme across provinces;
the redistribution of funds from richer to poorer provinces
does not seem to avoid inequity in health care use related
to between-province variations (for example, health care use
is lower in Quebec that has a lower-than-average income per
capita). As the author emphasizes, advocates of decentral-
ization would however consider these differences as related
to different preferences, hence legitimate. Income-related
inequity in health was mostly related to differences between
rich and poor people within provinces, here questioning
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he efforts by provinces to reduce inequalities (would a
entral government be more  committed to reduce inequity in
ealth?).
For Spain, Costa-i-Font26 found a small overall, within
nd between regions income-related inequality in health,
lthough somewhat higher in regions with lower autonomy.
he author explains this difference by the greater role of
he private sector in those regions. He also emphasizes that
ecentralization may have favored equity due to a high
ommitment of regions to achieve this objective, which
orresponds to a high citizens’ concern. Finally, Fredriks-
on and Winblad27 studied a speciﬁc reform toward more
rovider choice in Sweden, where health care use is highly
ecentralized at the county level. The author showed that
hile some counties supported the reform through favoring
hoice, others implemented administrative barriers against it.
herefore, autonomy on decision making (regarding provider
hoice) resulted on inequalities between people living in
ifferent Swedish counties.
ealth  expenditures
nequality related to decentralization was also observed indi-
ectly, through examining the impact of regional GDP per
apita on health care expenditures. Indeed, a greater impact of
egional income on health care expenditure would mean that
icher regions spend signiﬁcantly more  on health than poor
nes, hence creating inequalities in health care use. Although
ll studies using regional data conclude that health care
xpenditures do not vary much with income (the elasticity with
espect to income is below one), results are contrasted and
ary between countries. For Spain, Prieto and Lago-Pen˜as28
ound a positive relation between income and public health
xpenditures only in regions with higher ﬁscal autonomy.
egions without ﬁscal autonomy beneﬁtted from national
qualization efforts and therefore managed to achieve high
evels of health care expenditures despite of lower income. The
ow impact of income on health care expenditures in Spain
as conﬁrmed by Cantarero, Costa-i-Font and Moscone.29,11
he same conclusion could be drawn for Canada,21 although
he impact of income on health expenditures was greater than
n Spain. Using a speciﬁc indicator, Di Matteo and Di Matteo30
howed the positive impact of federal transfers on health care
xpenditure. That is, federal transfers certainly reduce the
mpact of regional income on expenditures but do not fully
orrect regional income discrepancies. The picture is some-
hat different in Italy, where regional income had a strong
mpact on health care expenditures.31 The authors showed
lso that cost-containment measures have not altered cross-
egional differences in health care expenditures and have
ven worsened them in some cases. For Switzerland, Crivelli
t al.32 observed a large impact of physician supply, which is
ighly variable across regions, on health care expenditures.
ence cross-regional differences in health care supply may
lso be a source of inequality across regions. Finally, using data
rom 110 regions of 8 OECD countries, Lopez-Casasnovas and
aez33 showed a low elasticity of health care expenditure with
espect to income. However, the impact of income was higher
cross regions in countries with higher inter-regional income . 2 0 1 3;3  1(1):74–83 81
inequalities, leading in turn to higher discrepancies in health
care expenditures.
Schefﬂer and Smith34, Costa-i-Font and Moscone11, Costa-
i-Font and Pons-Novell22 addressed the impact of decentral-
ization on health expenditures, while Bordignon and Turati35
examined the impact of the interaction between central and
sub-central governments. Schefﬂer and Smith34 showed for
California that spending on uninsured patients decreased
with the higher counties’ autonomy in allocating funds across
health and social programs. Costa-Font and Pons-Novell22
observed that Spanish regions with both political and ﬁs-
cal autonomy had higher health expenditures as compared
to regions without autonomy or with political autonomy
only. Costa-i-Font and Moscone11 observed however that
decentralization increased expenditures only in the short
run, producing savings in the long run. They argued that
ﬁrstly decentralization increased health care costs due to
sunk costs; then this effect was minimized in the long run
by an experience curve, that is, learning-by-doing allowed
reducing costs. Regarding assumptions from economic the-
ory, Costa-i-Font and Moscone11 also showed the existence
of spatial correlation of health care expenditures between
neighbor jurisdictions, sustaining the assumption of horizon-
tal spillovers. This result may hence be due to competition
between neighbor jurisdictions to increase attractiveness or
due to politicians being judged based on the neighbor coun-
terparts’ actions.
Finally, Bordignon and Turati35 used 1990s Italian adjust-
ment process imposed by an external entity (the European
Union) to understand the role of expectations and the strate-
gic interactions between the central state and regions, using
data on health care expenditures. Regions expecting that the
central government will intervene in case of debt softened
their budget constraints and the relationship between the
funding they receive from the central government and health
expenditures was lower. By contrast, during external adjust-
ment, the central government was perceived as more  stringent
and the link between funding and expenditures became
stronger. And the central government was also more  prone
to cut funding to regions because it knew its commitment
not to bailout would be taken more  seriously. Interestingly,
authors showed that more  autonomy lead to more  ﬁnan-
cially responsible policies because expectations of bailout
were low. This paper thus emphasized that transfer mecha-
nisms, which are always present in decentralized countries,
created incentives that may be more  or less detrimental for
efﬁciency depending on how they are designed and put in
practice.
Health  results
Results about the impact of decentralization on health
outcomes are scarce but consistent across studies. Jiménez-
Rubio12,36 and Cantarero and Pascual37 agree on identifying
a positive relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and
health results, measured through infant mortality. Cantarero
and Pascual37 used an alternative measure of health status
(life expectancy) which conﬁrmed the positive contribution of
decentralization to health status.
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Conclusion
Although the economics literature has largely discussed the
impact of decentralization, empirical results remain scarce,
in particular regarding decentralization in health. Neverthe-
less, decentralization of health policies and funding has been
largely implemented in various countries and is generally con-
sidered as a relevant option to improve efﬁciency in health
care.7
Our review of the literature allows draw preliminary
conclusions, based on relatively recent decentralization expe-
riences, in particular in Canada, Italy, Spain and Switzerland.
First and foremost, devolution of political (and ﬁscal) author-
ity to sub-government levels seems to increase health care
expenditures but also improve health outcomes, mainly mea-
sured through infant mortality rate. According to economic
theory, decentralization may foster competition between
jurisdictions to increase attractiveness, and increase pressure
on local governments because citizens evaluate their perfor-
mance based on neighbor counterparts’ actions. The empirical
literature suggests that enhanced competition prompts local
decision-makers to increase health care expenditures (race to
the top) and not the reverse in order to decrease taxes (race
to the bottom), with a favorable impact on health. The case
of Spain is particularly enlightening, which shows that the
increase in health care expenditures has been the highest
in regions with ﬁscal autonomy. This result may reﬂect the
high people’s demand for high-quality health services, and the
higher responsiveness of local authorities to this preference.
The higher health care expenditures under decentralization
may however reﬂect also higher costs, related for instance to
duplication of inputs (two neighbor regions offering similar
services which could be shared), diseconomies of scale, or the
sunk costs associated to implementation of a local health pro-
vision scheme. To some extent, adverse incentives may play
some role if sub-central governments are not fully ﬁnancially
responsible for their expenditures. In particular, moral  haz-
ard may exist if sub-central governments expect their debts
being covered by the central state (bailout) or if their budget
depends more  largely from transfers from the central state.
In a few words, decentralization does not appear at ﬁrst sight
as a means to control or reduce health care expenditures, but
as an incentive to provide better and possibly more  expensive
services. The efﬁciency consequences are thus ambiguous, as
it is unclear whether additional beneﬁts – measured through
a very reduced number of indicators – are worth additional
costs.
Regarding equity, empirical results are ambiguous and
certainly related to the speciﬁc countries’ context. Inequity
in health and health care is low in Spain, where health
expenditures are also poorly related to the region GDP/capita.
Additionally, inequity in health care seems to be lower in
more autonomous regions, so that decentralization may have
favored equity. In Canada, income-related inequity in health
care is related to between-provinces inequalities. In Italy and
Switzerland, there is a strong relationship between regions
(resp. cantons) income and health care expenditures, result-
ing in a large heterogeneity in health care expenditures.
These results may certainly be related to lower equalizing
1 a . 2 0 1 3;3 1(1):74–83
mechanisms in these two countries coupled with a higher
ﬁscal autonomy. Note also that different decisions across
regions, namely about physicians or equipment supply, also
potentially create differences/inequity in health care delivery.
To conclude, solidarity mechanisms across sub-central
authorities are relevant to avoid the emergence of large
inequalities across regions in health care delivery and expend-
itures. However, redistribution of funds also reduces juris-
dictions’ ﬁnancial responsibility, with possible detrimental
consequences on expenditures and ambiguous consequences
on efﬁciency. This last aspect is of particular importance if
jurisdictions compete with each other for providing high-
quality services and not through lowering tax rates.
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